The typical examples of alleged Categorical Imperatives given by Kant tell us what not to do; not to break promises, tell lies, commit suicide, and so on.  But as to what activities we ought to engage in, what ends we should pursue, the Categorical Imperative seems strangely silent.

Alasdair MacIntyre
A Short History of Ethics, 1998

MacIntyre may be overstating the case, but it does seem to be true to some extent. Perfect duties relate to actions and generally tell us what we must not do, they tell us that actions following from particular maxims are not permitted. If there is a situation where we only have a choice between two things and the categorical imperative rules out one of these then, by default, we are required to do the other. If we are in a situation where we either have to lie or tell the truth, since we are forbidden from telling a lie, we must tell the truth. See the story of the would be murderer.

Imperfect duties, however, do not relate to particular actions, they relate to pursuing particular ends. We are obliged to seek the well-being of both ourselves and others. Crucially, however, imperfect duties do not tell us what we must do in order to pursue those ends. We are given considerable latitude, that is we are given considerable freedom of choice, in how to fulfil our imperfect duties both in what to do and in how much to do it.

Just how much latitude we have has led to some debate among philosophers and an attempt to gain answers has often involved scouring Kant's other writings for clues. The details of that debate go way beyond what is required in this course. Suffice it to say opinion ranges from there being very considerable freedom to a more rigourist interpretation which gives a lot less freedom. Marcia Baron, an American philosopher, quoting Thomas Hill Jr., another American philosopher, says:

The standard view, insofar as there is one, is that taken by Hill... That view is that besides requiring one to adopt the obligatory ends, the imperfect duties require only that one "act accordingly, at least sometimes, if he gets a chance". Hill explains: "imperfect duties allow us to do what we please on some occasions even if this is not an act of a kind prescribed by moral principles and even if we could on those occasions do something of a kind that is prescribed. For example, though we have an imperfect duty of beneficence we may sometimes pass over an opportunity to make others happy simply because we would rather do something else."

Marcia Baron
Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology, 1995

One of the more rigourist interpretations that Baron considers, albeit finally rejects, is:

...the only permissible reason for not performing an act that falls under a principle of imperfect duty is (a) that one is performing another act which falls under a principle of imperfect duty or (b) that one is performing an act required by a perfect duty.

Marcia Baron
Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology, 1995

 

However, even this more rigourist interpretation still gives considerable scope for personal choice. It does mean that we spend all our time fulfilling our imperfect duties but since these include developing the well-being of ourselves and others it would be quite in order to enjoy an evening out with friends, and be thereby developing our bonds of friendship and companionship, both of ourselves and our friends, whilst at the same time ignoring, at least for now, the plight of the much less well off. Pretty much the only thing that is ruled out is living a life of idleness in which you choose to waste your life away.

 

 

 

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