His own rigoristic convictions on the subject of lying were so intense that it never occurred to him that a lie could be relevantly described as anything but just a lie (eg “a lie in such-and-such circumstances”).  His rule about universalizable maxims is useless without stipulations as to what shall count as a relevant description of an action with a view to constructing a maxim about it.

Elisabeth Anscombe
Modern Moral Philosophy, 1958

The starting point for the first formulation of the categorical imperative is identifying the maxim. Unfortunately, there is no clear way of doing this. As a result the categorical imperative runs into problems.

We have previously said that ‘a maxim is your own personal rule that tells you what to do in this kind of situation.’ One problem is that if the maxim is stated in lots of detail it results in the first formulation allowing actions that it should exclude. Suppose the maxim was,

If it is a particular time of a particular day of a particular year and I meet a particular person then I will cheat them.

This maxim will pass both contradiction tests and will therefore be deemed permissible. This is, of course, an extreme example and would probably be rejected as a legitimate example of a maxim. A maxim does require a certain amount of generality. The problem is there are no rules about how much generality is required.

Suppose the maxim was, ‘As someone from Scotland whenever I meet a Belgian I’ll do what I can to cheat them’. This maxim is reasonably general and also appears to pass both contradiction tests. The fact that if universalised Belgians would be on their guard against being cheated by people from Scotland doesn’t mean the whole concept of cheating has been undermined. Nor does it mean that Belgians would always successfully prevent themselves from being cheated. Of course, such cheating of Belgians would fail the second formulation as it would be a case of treating someone as a means only. However, this is an additional problem because both formulations are meant to give the same answer.

...with sufficient ingenuity almost every precept can be consistently universalized. For all that I need to do is to characterize the proposed action in such a way that the maxim will permit me to do what I want while prohibiting others from doing what would nullify the maxim if universalized. Kant asks if I can consistently universalize the maxim that I may break my promises whenever it suits me. Suppose, however, that he had inquired whether I can consistently universalize the maxim “I may break my promises only when. . . .” The gap is filled by a description devised so that it will apply to my present circumstances but to very few others, and to none such that if someone else obeyed the maxim, it would inconvenience me, let alone show the maxim incapable of consistent universality. It follows that in practice the test of the categorical imperative imposes restrictions only on those insufficiently equipped with ingenuity. And this surely is scarcely what Kant intended.

Alasdair MacIntyre
A Short History of Ethics, 1998

 

 

 

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