Categorical imperative: the second formulation.

The second formulation of the categorical imperative is, in many ways, simpler to understand than the first formulation. It says:

This formulation also results in perfect and imperfect duties.

• We have a perfect duty not to use humanity simply as a means only, i.e. we must never treat humanity, whether in our own person or in any other, simply as a means to get what we want.
• We have an imperfect duty to treat humanity as an end, i.e. rational humanity wherever we find it, in others or in ourselves, is intrinsically valuable and we demonstrate respect for that whenever we make its aims our aims.

It can help to understand this formulation by considering the difference between those things that have instrumental value and those things that have intrinsic value. My bank card, for example, has instrumental value, in that I can use it to get all sorts of other things that I want but it doesn't have any intrinsic value. If it wasn't able to get me any of those other things it would just be a piece of worthless plastic. Kant believes that people, due to their ability to freely act as rational beings, are not things to be used but have an intrinsic value that needs to be respected.

Kant uses the same four examples to illustrate the second formulation as he used to illustrate the first.

The duties to others are the less problematic. All of us, as rational beings, have certain aims. I am using someone 'simply as a means' if I so arrange things that they are helping me to achieve my aims without having freely chosen to assist me in achieving those aims. I am treating humanity within them as an end if I am, at least to some extent, helping them to achieve their aims.

Making false promises: The very nature of a false promise, and other similar kinds of deceit, is the deliberate attempt to get the other person to help me to achieve may own aims without them freely choosing to do so. Consequently, we have a perfect duty not to make false promises.
Ignoring those in need: Although this would not be a case of us using the other person as a thing or 'simply as a means' it would be wrong because we would not be fulfilling our (imperfect) duty to treat humanity as an end.

As was noted in connection with the first formulation both of these can be challenged. It is not difficult to create scenarios where making a false promise seems the right thing to do, or at least the less wrong thing to do. As for the imperfect duty not to ignore those in need, there is not only the problem of knowing how much help to give but, in addition, this formulation highlights another problem. Because the formulation says 'in the person of every other' it does suggest I have an imperfect duty to every individual person in need that I come across. There are practical considerations as to how this can be fulfilled. Presumably it would not be possible to give direct help to every person in need that I happen to encounter. Perhaps the duty might be fulfilled indirectly by, for example, campaigning for a fairer society where those in need are given appropriate support.

The duties to self are less intuitively obvious. 

Suicide: Kant's position is that we have a perfect duty not to commit suicide because doing so would be using humanity in our own person 'merely as a means'. He says, 'If he escapes from his burdensome situation by destroying himself, he is using a person merely as a means to keeping himself in a tolerable condition up to the end of his life.'  Kant is saying that suicide is treating the humanity within me merely as a thing that can be disposed of if that is what is needed to achieve my aims.

Not developing one's talents: It is Kant's position that 'In human nature there are predispositions to greater perfection that are part of nature‘s purpose for humanity'. Accordingly, if we have a duty, albeit an imperfect duty, to treat humanity within ourselves as an end, that is we have a duty to help humanity achieve its goals, we have a duty to move towards 'greater perfection' and that means developing one's talents.

There are problems with both of these. In the argument against suicide there is something a little odd in saying that you are using humanity in your own person merely as a means when it is exactly the same humanity that is trying to achieve a particular goal. It is getting very close to saying that we mustn't commit suicide because we have an obligation to perpetuate and support the humanity within us. However, that won't suit Kant at all because then it would fall under having an imperfect duty to treat humanity as an end. It is Kant's position that the two formulations are essentially equivalent and so the rule against suicide must, for him, fall under the rule of having a perfect duty not to treat humanity as simply a means.

As for having an imperfect duty to develop one's talents this depends on accepting the assertion that 'In human nature there are predispositions to greater perfection that are part of nature‘s purpose for humanity'. This can be questioned in all sorts of ways. Apart from anything else the idea that nature has a 'purpose for humanity' is extremely problematic.

 

 

 

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